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Abstract 
This article discusses the importance of social interaction for the development of the 
representations for symbolic communication. We suggest that there is no need to distinguish 
between different representational systems emerging at different stages of development. 
Instead, we propose that representations are rich right from the beginning of a child’s life, 
and that they are driven mainly by acting and interacting in the physical and social world. 
The more variety in a child’s interactional experience (i.e., synchrony, sequentiality, and 
prediction), the more enriched and abstracted the representations become. We review 
literature providing evidence for the ways in which infants’ development toward symbolic 
communication benefits from repeated social (inter)action and consider some implications for 
computational approaches. 
Keywords: rich representation, language acquisition, interaction, synchrony, contingency, 
sequentiality 
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1. Introduction 
Child development is commonly described as a progression through specific 
milestones over time. For language acquisition, this has led to the prominent view that a 
certain set of competencies is required in order to engage in referential communication; that 
is, to recognize the meaning of an utterance and to behave accordingly. Traditionally, these 
competencies are assumed to be acquired one after the other before children are able to 
participate in verbal interactions (e.g., Piaget, 1937/1954; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). 
According to Piaget (1937/1954), representational processes begin at approximately 7 to 9 
months, are transformed by 16 to 18 months, and become symbolic by the third year of life. 
In this approach, the infant’s own actions play a primary role in constructing the 
representational capacity that grows out of sensorimotor action (Piaget, 1937/1954). In 
support of this transformation process, Pruden, Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, and Hennon (2006) 
showed that 10-month-old infants build an association between a word and an object on the 
basis of that object’s perceptual saliency. In turn, 18-month-olds can make use of signals such 
as eye gaze to attend to an object of interest and learn new object names. Thus, children make 
sensorimotor experiences first, and within development, “cognition becomes progressively 
more abstract and less embodied” (Wellsby & Pexman, 2014, p. 1). 
Two main implications can be deduced from this approach: First, when cognition 
becomes progressively abstract, this implies that embodied experiences become less 
important. Yet, this contradicts current embodied theories of cognition (see Wellsby & 
Pexman, 2014). Second, and more relevant for our focus, is the implication that linguistic 
capabilities are built on top of these cognitive capabilities (e.g., Wellsby & Pexman, 2014; 
Wojcik, 2013). If this latter idea were to prove to be true, it would have serious consequences 
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for the way in which mental representations are used for later language acquisition: 
Representations connected to early cognitive competencies would have to become mapped 
onto later emerging linguistic capabilities (see Mandler, 2012; Wellsby & Pexman, 2014; 
Wojcik, 2013). From our perspective, this view is problematic and not in line with results 
from current research on the development of growing early linguistic representations in 
young infants. This suggests that infants as young as 6 months of age understand some 
language—long before they speak their first words (Bergelson & Swingley, 2012; Bortfeld, 
Morgan, Golinkoff, & Rathbun, 2005; Nomikou et al., in prep). 
As an alternative, we argue in favor of a continuous development of rich 
representations. Thus, instead of a transformation of initially sensorimotor to later symbolic 
representations, we propose a continuity of representations that is present from early on and 
shaped throughout development. This process is driven mainly by two factors: acting and 
interacting in the physical and social world. These two different forces pull each other 
forward and take turns as to which is pulling which. Yet, representations are not developed 
only through action and interaction. Their primary function is that they are construed for 
actions and interactions. In the following, we review current views on cognitive development, 
point to some research gaps that we see in the literature on language acquisition, and develop 
ideas on how to fill them. Our approach aims to sketch rich representation: that is, why 
representations need to be seen as rich (consisting of [inter]action and language) and how 
they become rich over the course of histories of interaction, or, in other words, during the 
process of development. 
2. Current Views on Cognitive Development 
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There is widespread agreement on physical interaction being at the heart of conceptual 
processes because they constrain how we perceive and conceive the environment (Glenberg, 
1997). Conceptualization as a process is fundamental to human cognition because it enables 
mental representation in, for example, inductive reasoning or language acquisition (Mandler, 
2012). On the other hand, the function of conceptualization is to reduce information and form 
conceptual spaces (Madole & Oakes, 1999). Yet, despite the agreement on the role of 
sensorimotor experiences for conceptualization, there is still an ongoing debate on how these 
sensorimotor experiences serve conceptualization. Wellsby and Pexman (2014, p. 1) identify 
the core of the debate as being about “whether sensorimotor experiences comprise conceptual 
knowledge and language or whether accessing this information merely activates sensorimotor 
areas epiphenomenally.” In other words, the debate is over whether sensorimotor experiences 
are essential for conceptualization or the result of spreading activation. 
In his developmental approach, Piaget assumed an abrupt change from the 
sensorimotor to the symbolic phase (Piaget & Inhelder, 1993). The ability to communicate 
symbolically plays a key role in this hypothesis. From Piaget’s perspective, linguistic 
symbols can be attached to a mental entity that is already in place as part of a representation. 
Likewise, an already shaped conceptual representation is often assumed to be a prerequisite 
for the introduction of a new linguistic form (Bloom, 2000). This process is described 
fittingly by the “waiting room” metaphor (Johnston & Slobin, 1979). It is only after a concept 
has been acquired that a child can link a linguistic form to it.  
Mandler (1998) has questioned this abrupt change from perceptual to conceptual 
knowledge. She proposes that as soon as children can parse the world into objects and 
actions, certain aspects of perceptual information are re-described to serve further cognitive 
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functions (Mandler, 2012). The involvement of own bodily experience and the focus on what 
objects do and what is done to them is crucial in this approach. Mandler (1998, 2012) 
introduces two parallel, ongoing forms of conceptualization that develop continuously and 
take different roles only during development: These are perceptual and conceptual 
categorization. The former, perceptual categorization, is the process of building 
representations of visible, tactile, and kinesthetic object features, and it is used for object 
identification. Whereas this process is more prominent in young infants, it is accompanied 
continuously by the development of the latter, conceptual categorization, that focuses on the 
functions and roles of objects and leads to the formation of image schemas and concepts. 
Concerning language acquisition, what prior approaches have in common is that they 
view language skills as developing on top of conceptual ones. One exception is the approach 
proposed by Göksun, Hirsh-Pasek, and Golinkoff (2010). In their view, there is at least a kind 
of permeability between concepts and language, allowing the conceptual level to adjust to 
experiences made during verbal interactions. The authors characterize this permeability as 
“trading spaces” (Göksun et al., 2010, p. 38). Accordingly, concepts acquired before an infant 
starts to be verbally productive can become modified—“traded for”—according to the 
categories available within the target language. Other concepts can become formed only 
when language has become available. 
What becomes obvious is that sensorimotor interactions with the environment are 
hardly ever considered to be important for both conceptual understanding and language 
processing (but see Gibbs, 2006; Wellsby & Pexman, 2014, for exceptions). Instead, in the 
majority of approaches to language acquisition, conceptualization gives rise to complex 
mental representations that eventually become semantic and abstracted from immediate and 
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particular experience (Akhtar & Tomasello, 2000). Evidently, this involves not only a 
qualitative change from sensorimotor experience to conceptual knowledge but also, and most 
importantly for us, a qualitative change from conceptual to symbolic representations.  
In summary, studies on conceptual development propose a qualitative change for the 
use of language. What remains unclear, however, is how those concepts that are already in 
place become “translated” for language use.  
3. Nature of Early Representations 
To the best of our knowledge, the only clear picture about how children can make use 
of concepts for language acquisition is presented in Mandler (2012). More specifically, she 
suggests that from the beginning of a child’s development, concepts (stemming from the 
child’s exploration in space) are formed and then recruited for early words. However, the 
problem with this view is that it requires universal—and not language-specific—concepts 
(McDonough, Choi, & Mandler, 2003). More specifically, universal concepts are assumed to 
be acquired before the infant’s language use. As they rely on the infant’s experience in space, 
they will be universal in the sense that they are not dependent on categories that may differ 
from language to language. For example, in Korean, the distinction between putting 
something into a container tightly (kkita) or loosely (nehta) is marked linguistically, whereas 
in English the two events can be described by one spatial preposition (in). Choi, McDonough, 
Bowerman, and Mandler (1999) have suggested that children become sensitive to categories 
offered in their language early in development. However, another possibility is that children 
first acquire finer concepts (such as that of tightness) (McDonough et al., 2003) that can then 
be used for the categories that are necessary in language (Göksun et al., 2010). At this point, 
we cannot provide a full picture on the debate about how language influences 
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conceptualization (but see, e.g., Bowerman, 1996 ; Choi et al., 1999). However, this debate 
reveals a discrepancy regarding the role of language and interaction: On the one hand, 
concepts are proposed that rely on infants’ spatial experience (Mandler, 2012); on the other 
hand, however, it is clear that language is already a resource in interactions with children 
right from the beginning, and that it affects which words children will learn first (Choi, 
2000). This is probably because it accompanies actions to a great degree from early on 
(Nomikou & Rohlfing, 2011). We shall take up this point in the next section.  
Another important aspect that remains unclear in current approaches to language 
acquisition is how concepts remain up to date so that they can be contextualized dynamically 
for the purpose of a task. In this sense, representations cannot be understood as simply 
standing in for something out there in the world. Behavioral and neuroscientific research has 
led to a new perspective in which representations have to be dynamic in nature. A growing 
body of research points out that a core function of representation is to enable meaningful 
predictions about the ongoing course of actions (Clark, 2013; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; 
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Accordingly, mental representations are not just associations 
relating current knowledge to past similar experiences. Instead, the key function of 
representation is to unearth the governing invariants of dynamic situations and recognize the 
structures of situated actions and interactions. This allows us to make meaningful predictions, 
that is, use the known and learned relations for a given context, and project these toward a 
further point in time. Interdisciplinary research has established prediction to be a key 
mechanism employed not only in observation, imitation, in understanding others’ actions, and 
in planning ahead (Clark, 2013; Glenberg, 1997; Jeannerod, 2006), but also in 
communication (Buccino et al., 2005; Feldman & Narayanan, 2004; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; 
 
Running head: RICH REPRESENTATIONS 
        
9 
Pulvermüller, 2005). Because the predictive and dynamic nature of mental representation 
appears to be at the core of many cognitive competencies, it always has to be kept in mind 
when considering the characteristics of representations. We shall follow this point and 
identify predictability as one of the dimensions of rich representations in following sections. 
4. What Do We Miss in Language Acquisition Models? 
In this section, we identify a gap between research proposing that prediction is a key 
mechanism in representations and mainstream developmental approaches. From our 
perspective, the gap emerges because developmental approaches disregard the influence of 
the environment (both physical and social) on learning processes. In particular, we argue that 
social interaction is the natural habitat for language and that it provides an entry into mental 
representations and language. 
It is generally accepted that interaction plays an important role in the development of 
social, cognitive, and linguistic skills (Bruner, 1983; de León, 2000). Yet current models 
addressing the way in which mental representations are established do not account for this 
fact. Instead, for example, in the trading spaces model proposed by Göksun et al. (2010), 
infants first explore their physical world. Then, “the more language [children] know, the 
more attentive they are to” language-specific categories (p. 38). Here, the assumption is that 
children need to produce language to become sensitive to it. Yet, there is a large body of 
research suggesting not only that infants orient themselves toward human voices (Colombo & 
Bundy, 1983; Muir & Field, 1979) or faces (Slater et al., 2010) but also that verbal signals 
help infants as young as 3 months of age to categorize objects (Ferry, Hespos, & Waxman, 
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2010). Thus, the assumption that children’s sensitivity to language starts later in development 
seems inconsistent with current research.  
The same critique applies to the Emergentist Coalition Model (Golinkoff & Hirsh-
Pasek, 2006, 2008; Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1996). This model adopts a hybrid approach, 
departing from the belief that children use multiple sources of information to learn language. 
According to the model, 10-month-old infants are initially sensitive to attentional cues such 
as perceptual salience, temporal contiguity, and novelty (Pruden et al., 2006). As they 
develop, they also become sensitive to social cues such as eye gaze, and, from around 18 
months of age, they can use this social information in the form of, for example, eye gaze or 
pointing gestures, to learn new words. 
As in Göksun et al.’s (2010) model, social interaction becomes important only in the 
later phase of development. It is not before 18 months that children start to pay attention to 
social cues. However, the transformation from a perception-guided to a socially aware child 
cannot be explained. Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek (2008) posit that the trigger for this 
transformation might be the recognition of others’ intentions. Yet it remains unclear how 
exactly children come to recognize intentions, and why social information becomes only 
gradually more important in language acquisition.  
In sum, most models attempting to explain the development of representations 
contrast the preverbal infant with the verbal infant. Her or his own verbal production is 
assumed to either induce a different kind of conceptualization (Göksun et al., 2010) or to 
initiate mapping of already existing concepts onto early words (Mandler, 2012).  
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Yet, we argue that infants’ cognition is influenced by language and interaction long 
before they produce their first words. A neurophysiological study by Parise and Csibra (2012) 
showed how an N400 effect documented that 9-month-old infants understand their mothers’ 
speech by suggesting the detection of a mismatch between an object appearing and a 
preceding label. In this vein, Bortfeld, Morgan, Golinkoff, and Rathbun (2005) as well as 
Bergelson and Swingley (2012) have shown that 6-month-old infants already understand 
some frequent nouns. How could it be possible for infants to understand language early but 
for this understanding not to affect their representations? Clearly, we need an approach to the 
development of representations that accounts for the experience with language that infants 
make before they start to speak. We call this experience the history of interaction that 
accumulates over the child’s development. 
We are convinced that models seeking to explain the development of representations 
need to focus more on the history of interaction in both a microgenetic and an ontogenetic 
timescale. Concerning the history of interaction, the microgenetic perspective takes into 
account the unfolding interaction in a particular moment within the course of a single 
interaction. Recently, Liszkowski (2014) has shown that preceding actions are a source by 
which children can infer others’ intentions and recognize the meaning of an utterance. 
However, rather than focusing on this timescale, we take an ontogenetic perspective and look 
at the cumulative history of interaction. Here it is clear that actions are recurrent and that 
children also draw from the recurrent context and their expectations when interpreting an 
ongoing situation (Rohlfing et al., 2016). We thus propose that situated interaction is the 
driving force for symbolic development right from the start (Rohlfing et al., 2016). We 
further propose that the situated interaction changes in quality as adults and children establish 
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shared activities as interactional histories and children gain interactional experience. In the 
following, we shall elaborate on our view of the co-development of symbolic and non-
symbolic skills and how these enhance and scaffold each other. In doing so, we shall attempt 
to contribute to understanding the nature of representations not only as structures that manage 
to integrate different sources of information with development (Pauen, Birgit, Hoehl, & 
Bechtel, 2015) but also as being rich in the sense of involving social information from early 
on. 
5. Toward Rich Representations: Linking Embodiment and Social Interaction 
Our argument needs to address two underlying questions: First, what is the force 
driving the growth of rich representations? And, second, what makes these representations 
rich? 
 We consider the key driving factor for the growth and enrichment of representation to 
be interaction, because it elicits meaningful actions from the child. The child has to apply and 
contextualize her or his accumulated knowledge in the form of a representation. 
Contextualization brings about the dynamic update of these representations. We propose that 
it is in the nature of our representations to be applied in interaction, that is, within a specific 
task involving the physical and/or social world. 
The motor ability of self-locomotion allows a child to discover increasingly more 
affordances of objects and enhances the growth of sensorimotor abilities. For example, 
Karasik, Tamis-LeMonda, and Adolph (2014) observed that children who move around have 
free hands not only to handle objects but also to bring them to their caregivers and, thus, to 
elicit further information about them. This example demonstrates impressively how 
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advancing motor abilities can change the nature of an interaction and enable new 
interactional experiences such as child-initiated bring-and-take routines. This example also 
reflects the growth of representations. Furthermore, we presume that representations can also 
grow through the variety in the forms of interaction that a child experiences: The more the 
interactional contexts vary, the more the child will come to find similarities or dissimilarities 
across them. Here, there is a lack of methodologically creative studies seeking ways to 
compare different contexts and reveal how representations become enriched and abstracted. 
Verbal expressions can be applied in early as well as later interactions (Bruner, 1983), 
and children seem to be particularly sensitive to this kind of behavior, preferring it over other 
acoustics (Colombo & Bundy, 1983; Muir & Field, 1979). Certainly, the nature of their 
meaning differs: Whereas concrete actions and functions underscore the meaning of a “ball,” 
more comparisons across different contexts are necessary to account for the word “happy.” In 
this sense, some expressions are a subset of abstract representations (Sadoski & Paivio, 2004) 
but not all language is abstract. 
Now, we turn to the question of what is rich in rich representations. Human 
representations are rich in that they are grounded, embedded, and coupled to our physical and 
social interactions. This allows them to be constructed out of our immediate environment and 
to be adaptive to any kind of context and interaction. Thus, it is not simply skill development 
that makes representations rich. Instead, representations become rich when contextualized in 
and for an interaction; that is, when the newly developed skills are utilized for a particular 
task. In this sense, early mother–child interaction may provide a context for stimulating the 
child’s perceptual system. It may well be that early in development, the child does not 
perceive actions as “caused” by someone else, let alone as intentionally addressed to her or 
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him. It might also be that the child does not perceive these actions as an interaction at all. We 
propose that what might start off by being only the perception of an immediate effect, a 
contingency (Cangelosi et al., 2010; Watson, 1985), is then enriched within interaction to 
become a representation of predictable rules. We shall elaborate on this below. Other existing 
approaches have proposed that the “initial spatially based conceptual system” receives 
enrichment via emotions and language (Mandler, 2012, p. 440). We propose that it is not 
solely due to a child’s language that enrichment is initiated, because language is present in 
early activities (Nomikou & Rohlfing, 2011). Instead, it is an outcome of the child’s growing 
experience in interaction and the awareness of her or his roles when performing joint actions. 
Thus, we assume that the rich neural structure of representation is constituted of (and cannot 
be separated from) multiple interactional experiences from the beginning of a child’s life 
(Anderson, 2010). 
There is one specific feature of the representational richness that we would like to 
emphasize here: the bidirectionality of action and language. It is reasonable to assume that 
language is grounded in rich representations, and that it uses the same resources of (brain) 
structure that are involved in an agent’s actions. In fact, Wagner and Lakusta (2009) postulate 
equivalence between language and action concepts (cf. Göksun et al., 2010). Yet there is also 
the other direction, because there have been some analyses of how language can interact with 
conceptual and motor processes. With the notion of “acoustic packaging,” Hirsh-Pasek and 
Golinkoff (1996) have proposed that even surface properties of language such as prosody act 
as “carving knives” (p. 161) aiding the child in constructing primary representations of action 
units. Following this idea, Brand and Tapscott (2007) showed that infants group sequences of 
actions as belonging together according to the way in which these have been “packaged” by a 
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narration. More recently, Gampe and Daum (2014) showed that for older children, the 
semantics of language influence action understanding: When primed with an action word, 24-
month-old infants will predict the goal of the presented action more quickly. In addition to 
language facilitating action representations, studies have also demonstrated that 
accompanying a visual presentation with language enhances infants’ conceptualization 
processes (Balaban & Waxman, 1997; Ferry et al., 2010; Plunkett, Hu, & Cohen, 2008). 
Research has started to address the issue of co-developing language and action (Cangelosi et 
al., 2010), but we need to know more about how their mutual influence shapes the 
representational level from the beginning, and not just when children start to produce their 
first words. Furthermore, we propose that we need to know how this mutual influence is 
contextualized in interaction. 
TABLE 1 here 
In the following, we want to pick out a few characteristics to illustrate the process of 
the development of rich representations. We view these characteristics as contexts that enrich 
representations and are not bound by a temporal order. However, even though the 
characteristics do not occur in a developmental sequence, they do depend on each other in the 
sense that, for example, turn-taking makes a whole routine possible. Table 1 gives a broader 
overview of the emerging characteristics and the qualitative change they bring about. Of 
course, the increase in enrichment implicitly suggests some order. Yet in our approach, this 
order does not refer to the development of skill or competence in the child, but rather to the 
complexity of the contexts enabling new qualities of richness in the representations.  
5.1 Intermodal synchrony: Embodiment 
 
Running head: RICH REPRESENTATIONS 
        
16 
The infant is born in a vivid world full of sensations that she or he can perceive 
through a vast array of sensory systems: vision, audition, touch, smell, proprioception, and 
balance. Gibson (1966) suggests that invariance in the perceptual array can be picked up 
across modalities. This is called direct perception. For example, what looks like an apple, 
feels like an apple, and smells and tastes like one will be perceived as belonging together, 
constituting an apple. This information is already structured in the environment, so the 
perceiver does not need to integrate it actively in order to perceive unity. For the development 
of representations from an embodied view, this principle equips naive learners with a 
mechanism for perceiving and structuring the environment they inhabit. 
Accordingly, infants as young as a few weeks old can make use of sensory 
information originating from different modalities to help them perceive unity in their 
environment (Bahrick, Lickliter, & Flom, 2004; Lewkowicz, 2000) through intersensory 
facilitation (Bahrick & Lickliter, 2000; Gibson, 1966). This is biologically plausible, because 
according to theories of embodied cognition, unity of perception and dynamic categories for 
objects and actions emerge from the time-locked correlation of multisensory experiences that 
vary with the infant’s activity and actions. Right from the start of their life, infants are, thus, 
capable of perceiving unitary objects, integrating information from multiple sources, and 
constructing meaningful units that will in time become linguistic units (Thelen & Smith, 
1994). Yet, perception does not develop in a social vacuum but within a certain social 
context; that is, within daily encounters with social partners who affect the way infants act, 
interact, and learn language. In a recent study, Cekaite (2016) revealed that perception of 
touch is used to organize the interaction. By using sustained touch in adult-child interaction, 
touch was applied to establish a corporeal perceptual field that affords emerging contingent 
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In this sense, apart from being a form of action, multimodal synchrony as a type of 
coordinated behavior can also be a form of interaction.  
5.2 Interpersonal synchrony and alignment: Mirroring and contingency 
Rączaszek-Leonardi, Nomikou, and Rohlfing (2013) have suggested that synchrony 
does not just appear within one partner’s communicative turn but can be distributed over 
interacting parties. Within interaction, we argue, synchrony creates opportunities for the 
perception of different characteristics of representations. As mentioned above, intermodal 
synchrony is the perception of similarity in multiple sources of information in the 
environment. In contrast, interpersonal synchrony is similarity between one’s own behavior 
and the behavior of another person; and these two, we argue, are qualitatively different 
perceptions. We suggest that because infants are born into a world of social interactions, the 
perception of intermodal synchrony is embedded in their early social interactions. Thus, we 
do not view intermodal and interpersonal synchrony as distinct processes, but rather as 
nested, systemic characteristics. 
In interactional synchrony, there is an alignment of the individual contributions of 
interacting parties that becomes a property of the dyad. Interactional synchrony refers to a 
type of interaction between a child and caregiver (e.g., mirroring a smile). It is a pattern of 
interaction that is regulated mutually and is reciprocal (Harrist & Waugh, 2002). As such, it 
involves dynamic adaptation on the part of both partners. In early mother–infant interactions, 
this has been confirmed in the temporal alignment of activity level (Beebe et al., 1982; 
Papoušek & Papoušek, 1989; Stern, 1985) observed in facial expressions (Beebe et al., 1982; 
Stern, 1974; Trevarthen, 1979) and properties of vocalizations (Leimbrink, 2010; Papoušek & 
Papoušek, 1989). This behavioral alignment goes beyond pure mimicry to subserve 
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interpersonal coordination (Jaffe, Beebe, Feldstein, Crown, & Jasnow, 2001): To achieve 
synchronous interactions, the partners align their own behavior to the signals of the other 
interacting partner, allowing the discovery of regularities between them. In this way, partners  
“share” subjective states and emotional expressions (Trevarthen, 1979). 
Thus, if experiencing intermodal synchrony assists infants in perceiving unity in the 
environment, experiencing synchrony within interaction is even more powerful because it 
does not just involve the sensory information originating from one’s self. This information 
also causes a reaction in another person. Harrist and Waugh (2002, p. 564) refer to this as the 
“experience of effectance.” This is the experience of the completion of self-initiated actions. 
The experience of effectance can also be seen in dialogical interaction in which a 
sequence of actions (see Table 1) is construed jointly. Reddy and Uithol (2015) point to the 
fact that to engage with another dialogically, you need not the same but a different “other,” 
because a dialogue is about complementarity and not mirroring. In dialogical interactions, the 
behavior of one participant is seen as constraining that of the other (Rączaszek-Leonardi et 
al., 2013). Consequently, within early social interaction, children might become sensitized to 
sequential patterns that bear characteristics that are produced collaboratively. As the child 
learns to participate in sequences of actions such as openings or give-and-take (Nomikou, 
Rohlfing, & Szufnarowska, 2013; Papoušek & Papoušek 1990), her or his actions involve 
simple, locally contingent moves that have a function. As interactional moves become 
functional, they provide a further characteristic of richness. Representations become adaptive 
to different situations and moldable by experience. 
5.3 Establishing rules of exchange: Conventionalized sequential organization 
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One aspect introducing a further characteristic of richness is interactional history, that 
is, the experience accumulating through recursive situations (see also Bruner, 1983; Hsu & 
Fogel, 2003). In the previous section, we suggested that regularities emerge from the 
interaction itself and constrain the way in which the next action will take place. Here, we 
further suggest that through repetitions over time, the regularities may enable the emergence 
of conventionalized action sequences—or routines—that lead to enculturation and the 
development of language (Rohlfing et al., 2016). We assume that this enables new 
characteristics of representations that, again, further enrich existing ones. 
Routines form a basic constituent of orderly social life (Goffman, 1967; Peters & 
Boggs, 1986) and have been considered as foundational for early language acquisition 
(Bruner, 1983; Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2015). Many of the routines established preverbally are 
designed to involve the child directly. Examples are give-and-take games (Ratner & Bruner, 
1978), peek-a-boo (Bruner & Sherwood, 1976), and caretaking routines (Ferrier, 1978; 
Nomikou, 2015; Tulbert & Goodwin, 2011). What all these activities have in common is that 
they form recurrent joint action patterns or “standard action formats” (Bruner, 1975; 
Rohlfing et al., 2016). This definition highlights two crucial aspects of routines: The activity 
is co-constructed jointly and it has to occur repeatedly. Being co-constructed, these activities 
are interactive in nature. Thus, they entail not only a particular temporal order of individual 
actions (“what to do next”) but also a particular social organization: Participants assume 
certain interactive roles and take responsibility for role-related tasks (“who does what”). This 
enables the participants to anticipate actions and to develop expectations regarding how 
actions relate not only to each other but also to certain outcomes or effects (Ambrosini et al., 
2013; Fantasia, Fasulo, Costall, & López, 2014). Being recurrent, routines are said to enable 
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the child to develop basic cognitive concepts such as that of agent, action, object, or recipient 
that also underlie linguistic symbols (Bruner, 1975) We suggest that the routines themselves 
provide a vehicle for developing basic representations underlying verbal communication; 
they are not linguistic themselves, because a correspondence between action structure and 
grammatical structure is not necessary. 
As demonstrated by Gleason and Weintraub’s (1976) study of the trick-or-treat 
routine, children realize the linguistic constituents of a routine without understanding (and 
without being taught) the semantic meaning of the utterances. This suggests that verbal 
participation in the routine does not necessarily build on the development of linguistic 
representations. Instead, highly formulaic routines (Gleason, Perlmann, & Greif, 1984) such 
as trick-or-treat seem to be representations learned as a social practice. This also argues 
against a strict differentiation between nonlinguistic and linguistic representations. Even if 
children do not employ verbal resources productively in their first months of life, they are 
involved in verbal interactions from the outset. Given the fact that children are addressed as 
co-participants right from the beginning (de Léon, 2000), we propose that they do not have to 
pass through a “prelinguistic stage” (see our argumentation in Section 3 above). Thus, the 
development of representations is a continuous process. Expanding on social-pragmatic 
theories (Bruner, 1983; Tomasello, 2003), we propose that by participating in routine 
activities, children learn to represent shared purposes. 
The shared purpose of peek-a-boo and vocal-kinetic play routines, for instance, is to 
experience excitement, togetherness, and joint pleasure (Fantasia et al., 2014). Likewise, 
when reading a book, co-participants pursue a sharing of the activity with each other. 
Therefore, we argue that successful participation in activity routines enables the emergence 
 
Running head: RICH REPRESENTATIONS 
        
21 
of an interactive representation of the shared purpose of an activity. Most importantly, by 
assuming interactive representations, we can avoid thinking about representations in terms of 
“reading” co-participants’ intentions, because this automatically presupposes some higher 
order cognitive ability, the onset of which is then assumed to take place later in development. 
With respect to activity-based routines such as peek-a-boo and vocal-kinetic 
play/nursery rhymes, their purpose can be characterized as conveying immediate bodily and 
socio-emotional experiences. Sequential analyses have demonstrated that the adult’s 
interactive support is not geared toward making the child understand what the adult has in 
mind, but rather toward making the child realize “what comes next” (Heller & Rohlfing, 
2015; Tarplee, 2010). Rather than forming representations of the co-participant’s intentions, 
the child needs “to recognize, project, and employ unfolding structures of action from the 
naturally situated behaviors of others” (Lerner, Zimmerman, & Kidwell, 2011, p. 57). 
The ability to anticipate a number of sequentially organized actions forms the basis 
for participating in complex routines that encompass a number of adjacency pairs such as 
summons–answer, identification–recognition, greetings, and “how are you” in greeting 
routines (cf. Strähle, 2013). By the age of 3 years, children can take the initiative for the 
transition to the next action. It can be assumed, therefore, that they have developed a 
representation of the sequential organization of the greeting routine. 
Using appropriate conventionalized communicative means, for example, knowing 
how to respond to a greeting, is, we argue, similar to being able to use symbols. On the one 
hand, such symbols are constructed within ontogenetic ritualization: Particular social 
behaviors emerge from interaction and come to function as intentional communicative signals 
(e.g., Marentette & Nicoladis, 2012; Spranger & Steels, 2014). For example, a mother–infant 
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dyad may develop a tickling routine, such that some communicative signal may emerge as a 
convention for initiating the tickling. On the other hand, they are transmitted within a process 
of enculturation: By participating in routines, such as greetings, children are instilled with 
culturally appropriate ways of interacting.  
5.4 Predictability as an underlying mechanism 
What the above-mentioned characteristics have in common is that they all supply children 
with a sense of predictability: within their own bodies and for the interaction with the 
physical or social world. In fact, within the initial cognitive endowment, Bruner (1983, p. 24) 
postulates that “much of the cognitive processing going on in infancy appears to operate in 
support of goal-directed activity.” An infant seems to be “sensitive to the requirements of 
prediction” (Bruner, 1983, p. 24), which means that it is important for an infant to establish a 
knowledge base on which a situation can be interpreted. Papoušek, Papoušek, and Harris 
(1987) have shown how keen infants are to predict a behavior when they describe the “smile 
of predictive pleasure” in infants, suggesting that infants feel comfortable and draw pleasure 
from successfully predicting their environment. 
Adding to current approaches postulating that children need to develop a conception 
of goal-directed activity by recognizing “the relation between the agent and his or her goal” 
(Gerson & Woodward, 2014, p. 264), we propose that although this ability emerges from 
sensorimotor experience (Woodward, 1999), it is simultaneously nested within interactional 
experience (Rączaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013; Reddy & Uithol, 2015). Thus, infants 
simultaneously develop action control for their own and for collaborative actions. Evidence 
in favor of our argument is provided by Kaye and Wells (1980) in their work on neonates 
responding to a contingent action provided by their mothers. In their view, feeding “can 
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appear to be an exchange of turns, in which the infant’s pause is answered by the mother’s 
jiggling and the end of jiggling is answered by the next burst” (p. 29). Already in such early 
interactions, the dynamic and predictive nature of representation appears to be a crucial 
characteristic. Providing further evidence along these lines, Reddy, Markova, and Wallot 
(2013) report on 2 month-olds showing anticipatory body adjustments to being picked up. 
Similarly, Rączaszek-Leonardi et al. (2013) argued that shared intentionality emerges within 
repeated interactions as the child’s actions become incorporated into dialogical events, and 
that through participation in these shared events, the infant’s actions become parts of 
meaningful wholes in which these actions have specific causal consequences. Take the 
example provided by Reddy et al. (2013) of a child anticipating the mother’s action of 
picking up: The infant’s representations not only allow her to foresee in the sense of 
simulating the action; they also capture the fact that the child is a part of this action with her 
own body. It is likely that growing experience in different interactive activities gives rise to 
further types of rich representations that can be utilized in more complex predictions such as 
mental simulations (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005. To apply a mental simulation, it is necessary to 
differentiate who is doing what for which purpose. Such fully-fledged mental simulations are 
assumed to underlie language understanding (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Pulvermüller, 2005). 
Our approach suggesting that language is a part of early interactions right from the beginning 
may help to reveal a way to investigate the development of the mutual influence of action and 
language on the representational level.  
6. Conclusions 
Interaction is crucial for the development of early embodied knowledge and mental 
representations. Whereas existing approaches focus on children’s sensorimotor experiences 
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flowing directly into the structure of cognitive knowledge, we provided evidence strongly 
suggesting that from early on, children’s experiences are shaped by—and benefit from—their 
participation in social interaction. 
We proposed that there is no need to distinguish between different representational 
systems that come into place at different stages of development. Rather, we argued that 
representations are rich right from the beginning of a child’s life. In time, they are further 
enriched as they grow during development through the influence of (inter)action. Verbal 
expressions can occur already in early interactions. The nature of their meaning differs 
depending on which task they are applied in. We therefore proposed that some expressions 
are a subset of abstract representations (Sadoski & Paivio, 2004). 
From our perspective, the role of interaction for enriching representations is twofold: 
On the one hand, representations are developed through action and interaction. Through 
participation in different interactive activities, the child first experiences intermodal and 
interpersonal synchrony of actions and emotional states. As children develop increasing 
motor and cognitive skills and participate in increasingly complex forms of (inter)action, this 
affords the representation of new dimensions of richness, especially knowledge of purposes 
and sequentiality of (inter)actions. Thus, on the other hand, representations are also construed 
for actions and interactions: Building up knowledge of the sequential organization of an 
activity enables the child to initiate activities and act more autonomously. 
Thus, early representations may contextualize a child’s action for a particular task. 
The function of this action is then to be predictive in the sense of initiating and connecting 
actions to effects in the physical or social world. In its structure, it must embody synchronous 
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and sequential action steps as well as some information about the roles that are to be fulfilled. 
Representations become rich when newly developed skills are utilized for a particular task. 
This approach has implications for both empirical and computational research. We 
propose that experimental studies should not position infants in a spectatorial stance (Reddy 
& Uithol, 2015) in which they are treated as observers and analyzers of a situation or an 
action. Given the importance of engagement in interaction for rich representation, 
experimental paradigms should embed children into contexts in which they participate in 
actions and do not just observe them. Furthermore, experimental studies should consider the 
history of interaction as a factor of the settings. Because children bring interactional 
expectations into any situation, experiments should make use of these expectations by 
positioning children in an interactional frame in which they can use their expectations to 
solve a task, make correct inferences, or form categories (e.g., Ferguson & Waxman, 2016).  
In observational studies and the analysis of data corpora, coding schemes should 
incorporate multiple verbal and nonverbal resources (e.g., Nomikou & Rohlfing, 2011; de 
Barbaro, Johnson, & Deák, 2015). Existing approaches in dynamic systems research have 
provided insights into the dynamics of, for example, oral–manual coupling throughout 
infants’ development (e.g., Iverson & Thelen, 1999). Furthermore, analyses should consider 
the dyad as the minimal unit of analysis. There is already a long tradition in qualitative 
methods and multiple-case analyses of using conversation analysis and microanalysis (e.g., 
Rossmanith, Costall, Reichelt, López, & Reddy, 2014; Takada, 2005). The generalization 
from single cases to entire corpora requires dynamic measures that can reveal the nonlinear, 
emergent quality of the relationship between interacting parties in order to incorporate the 
situated, embodied aspects of interactions and the process of development within the history 
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of interactions. First studies have started to appear using nonlinear methods such as 
recurrence quantification analysis (e.g., Nomikou, Leonardi, Rohlfing, & Rączaszek-
Leonardi, 2016; Warlaumont, Richards, Gilkerson, & Oller, 2014). 
Further implications involve computational approaches. The view presented here is in 
line with the fundamental ideas of embodied cognition (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & 
Wilson, 2008). Representations have to be grounded. Importantly, rich representations 
assume a strong notion of embodiment as proposed by, for example, Lakoff (1987): The 
meaning of every, even quite high-level (or abstract) concept is rooted in lower-level and 
embodied (structured) experience. The consequence for modeling approaches is that this 
requires rich and connected representations. Most examples in present-day modeling 
approaches deal only with static features and percepts. But rich representations have to be 
dynamic in their nature in order to capture temporal progression as well as to allow for 
predictions. As argued, action and interaction are the key to guiding and driving 
conceptualization. It is thus necessary for processes themselves to also be capable of being 
represented. Current work in developmental robotics has started to focus on representation of 
actions and events (Feldman & Narayanan, 2004; Schilling & Narayanan, 2013; Summer-
Stay, Teo, Yang, Fermüller, & Aloimonos, 2013). Importantly, such dynamically rich 
representations must be able to express more than simple sequences. They should express 
rich temporal relations allowing for synchronization and co-occurrence, because these are 
prerequisites for the interaction and cooperation during which multiple co-occurring actions 
unfold and have to be synchronized (Schilling & Narayanan, 2013). 
Central to our view is that these representations are enriched continuously during 
development. We do not assume multiple representational systems that are bootstrapped one 
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after the other. Instead, conceptual, semantic, and linguistic representations are tightly 
interwoven and all develop continuously. Over time, they take different roles and differ in 
their importance. This is in line with Pezzulo et al.’s (2012) view on grounded cognition that 
argues in favor of embodied computational models and, in particular, of integrated 
representation. Our approach extends their view, because although their view acknowledges 
the dynamic nature of representation, it lacks the structure required to organize interaction. 
Whereas Cangelosi et al. (2010) share the view that conceptualization is driven by action and 
social interaction, the key differences to the view proposed here are that action and 
interaction are treated separately and are based on different skills as well as representation. 
Also, they see language as a functionality built on top of a conceptual space that is already in 
place. Cangelosi et al. (2010) point out four major current challenges: learning compositional 
action, lexica, social interaction, and integrating action and language representation. From 
our point of view, these cannot be separated, and it is this last challenge—the connection 
between action (as dynamic and structured representations) and language representation (in a 
broader sense because it should also include interaction)—that needs to be addressed first. 
Only a focus on continuous enrichment will lead toward models that allow us to integrate any 
interaction experience from early on and to bootstrap language from these experiences. 
Whereas such a rich representation system appears difficult to approach, Cangelosi et al.’s 
(2010) suggestion that one should focus on differences in functionality provides a good 
starting point. Such systems have and can further provide insights into the development of 
rich representation that can guide further research. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of richness: The table illustrates how different forms of (inter)action give rise to 
different experiences that, in turn, enrich representations 
Form of (Inter-)Action Experience Characteristics of 
Rich Representation 
Examples 
Intra-personal, intermodal 
synchrony 
Binding of multimodal sources 
=> unity 
Embodied, perceptual Bahrick et al., 2004; 
Lewkowicz, 2000; 
Nomikou & Rohlfing, 
2011; 
Zukow-Goldring, 1997 
Inter-personal synchrony Alignment 
Notion of the other develops. 
Coordinated Jaffe et al., 2001; 
Stern, 1985 
Alternate actions Contingency, complementarity 
Organized joint action, 
including turn-taking (as 
alternation) 
Contingent Bateson, 1979; 
Papoušek & Papoušek 
1990; 
Nomikou et al., 2013 
Goal directed actions Purposefulness, joint goal 
Understanding the joint action 
and how to complement the 
other. 
Functional, 
Purposeful 
Rączaszek-Leonardi et 
al., 2013 
Conventionalized goal 
directed actions 
Culturally instilled roles and 
purposes 
Role understanding and 
conventionalized frames are 
shaped. 
Sequential Bruner, 1983; 
Bruner & Sherwood, 
1976;  
Ratner &Bruner, 1977; 
Strähle, 2013; 
Peters & Boggs, 1986 
Pretense Transcending the here and now 
Representation (schematic, 
frames) can be applied in novel 
contexts– “as if” behavior– 
allowing a form of meta-
cognition 
Hypothetical, 
Fictitious 
Harris & Kavanough 
,1993; 
Rakoczy & Tomasello, 
2006; 
Friedman & Leslie, 2007; 
Sobel, 2007 
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